A call to arms: cross-regional communication and the Visigothic military (pdf)
(*En Portugués aquí; En Español aquí; En français ici)
During the course of the sixth century, the nature and organization of the Visigothic military changed substantially. These changes were part of a larger process in which the Visigothic kingdom itself underwent a radical reorganization that included the loss of most of its Gallic territory, a few very large revolts, as well as a massive invasion by the Eastern Roman Empire as part of Justinian’s attempted reconquest of the western Mediterranean. Possibly the most important events that occurred during this era were related to the efforts by Liuvigild (r. 567-586) and Reccared (r. 586-601) to unite the Iberian Peninsula under the leadership of the Visigothic monarchy. One of the key elements in this process was the establishment of cross-regional ties that served to connect regions as far apart as the Gothic territories in the south of Gaul and the western portions of the Iberian Peninsula, and to bring them under the leadership of a single administrative entity, which attempted to unite its territories in political and theological purpose.
In this essay, I analyze the role and evolution of the Visigothic military during this era and its connection to these larger events, especially in terms of that cross-regional communication. I argue that the development of a high degree of native support for the ambitions of the Visigothic monarchy served to facilitate unification, even while that monarchy itself often faced resistance from much of the Gothic nobility. The result was that by the end of the sixth century the Visigothic monarchy, which had begun the century as Germanic invaders, ended the century as the legitimate rulers of a new Romano-Gothic kingdom. The following affords not only some suggestions as to how this process occurred, but also some insight into how a small conquering force became a legitimate governing body.
In the year 589, the Visigothic kingdom underwent both a serious revolt of the Gothic nobility as well as a major invasion of the northeastern province of Narbonensis by a Frankish army. The king, Reccared, was able to overcome these challenges in part by relying on a Hispano-Roman military commander named Claudius, dux of Lusitania, who led the counterattack against the Franks with an apocryphally small army (no more than 300, according to John of Biclar). The event itself receives some comment in contemporary historical sources, but the discussions leave important questions unanswered: why did Reccared place the future stability of the kingdom in the hands of a non-Gothic noble from Lusitania who would have to cross to the far end of the kingdom in order to meet the military threats, and why did they face the Frankish invasion with such a small army? The answers to these questions, I argue, reveal a radical change in the Visigothic kingdom, which was instrumental in the creation of a new, centralized Visigothic state.
Although this is not the appropriate place for a full discussion of the Visigothic military, it is necessary to establish a basic understanding of the Visigothic military system prior to the reign of Reccared. As with so many topics relating to the Visigoths, gaining a clear and accurate idea of the details of the military is difficult, if not impossible, due to the limitations of the sources. Still, looking at the works of the historians of the sixth and seventh centuries, there are a number of observations that can be made that will help to establish a broad picture of the general military situation of the era.
The textual sources suggest that between the Battle of Vouillé in 507 and the reign of Liuvigild beginning in 569, the Visigoths were limited in their military capabilities. Many scholars have pointed out the importance of private armies during this period, and at times it seems as if the core of the military was bodies of personal retainers that individual nobles maintained. The absence of an organized army seems unlikely, though, and many scholars have assumed the existence of an armed presence across the kingdom largely because there should have been one. That may not be the case, though, and there are reasons to suspect the absence of large scale military power throughout much of the kingdom.
Although there is limited specific information regarding Visigothic military garrisons during this period, there are useful comparisons to be drawn from looking at the situation of the Ostrogoths in Italy during the sixth century. Procopius (c. 500-554) provides a very good account of the situation in Ostrogothic Italy, which was probably similar to what could be found in the Visigothic kingdom. More importantly, because the Ostrogoths provided military security for the Visigothic kingdom during much of the early part of the sixth century in the aftermath of the Battle of Vouillé, it is reasonable to conclude that the Ostrogoths had a stronger army and a firmer grasp on their conquests. Whatever the relative strength or weakness of the Ostrogothic army at the time, the Visigothic military was probably weaker.
According to Procopius, Belisarius’s army was about 7,000 in number, hardly an overwhelming force. Yet Belisarius was able to besiege towns openly and engage in extended warfare from Sicily to Rome without the Ostrogothic king, Theodahad (r. 534-536), sending a force to stop him. Procopius writes that the Gothic nobility complained bitterly that Theodahad had not attacked Belisarius’s army, but it is likely that there was a good reason for this. His army was spread out among the major towns performing garrison duty and Theodahad had to choose between defending the towns from possible revolts and meeting Belisarius’s army in the field. Following the assassination of Theodahad, the next king, Vitiges (r. 536-540), admitted as much by urging caution on the part of the Goths rather than making a rash attack on Belisarius’s army, because most of the Gothic army was spread out in the north and engaged in conflict with the Franks in Gaul. Procopius writes that Vitiges first decided to leave a garrison of 4,000 in Rome and then move north with his other troops to gather the entire Gothic army for a concentrated attack. In the event, however, he decided to leave sizeable portions of his army in Gaul for fear that the Franks would “overrun both Gaul and Italy […] if he should march with his whole army against Rome.” Gathering the army took time and involved considerable calculations about how large the garrisons of the individual towns should be, as well as equipping the army. This suggests that the Gothic warriors were not equipped for war on a regular basis, and that they only armed themselves for serious purposes when the necessity arose. The Goths, it seems, never had more than a limited ability to defend a region they had conquered.
The evidence is sparse, but this appears to have been the case in Visigothic Spain during the sixth century as well. The sources mention very few military episodes during this period but those that are mentioned reveal a small, often weak military force that was readily available for any particular monarch, but seldom engaged in large-scale action, and then only for limited periods of time. The situation becomes a bit more interesting after the accession of Liuvigild, owing to that king’s energy and ambition. He seems to have spent most years on campaign, and, as will be discussed below, possibly experimenting with the creation of a regular army.
Reading John of Biclar, it is striking just how weak the Visigothic monarchy seemed at the beginning of Liuvigild’s reign, yet armed conflict was almost constant from the time that he ascended the throne until the reign of his son Reccared. Scholars have been divided over whether these campaigns represent the suppression of revolts or actual conquests, and John of Biclar’s testimony can be read to support both contentions. Whatever the truth of that matter, it is obvious that when Liuvigild came to the throne, he was limited in territory and took immediate steps to increase his own power and the power of the monarchy itself.
During the first years of Liuvigild’s reign he continually expanded the borders of the Visigothic kingdom by conquering or reconquering territory until in 578, according to John of Biclar, “With tyrants defeated on all sides and the invaders of Spain overcome, King Liuvigild was allotted a period of peace and resided with his people.” In 579, however, his son Hermenegild began a revolt and seized a number of “cities and fortresses,” including Seville. Liuvigild’s initial response was not to lead an army against the rebels. Instead, he held a synod of Arian bishops in 580 and began to formulate his plan to convert the entire kingdom to Arianism. In 581 he seized part of the Basque country and founded another city. It was not until 582, in the third year of Hermenegild’s rebellion, that Liuvigild finally began the process of subduing his son by “raising an army.”
The important point here is that he had to “raise” an army, either because he did not have a standing army upon which to rely, or because a large enough part of the army had joined the revolt and hampered Liuvigild’s ability to address the rebels in the field. Liuvigild’s military expansion also meant that more troops had to be expended on garrison duty, which reduced the overall number he would have had at his disposal. Thus, even after three years, Liuvigild had to go through the process of raising an army, which he was not even able to use until the next year, 583, at which time Liuvigild finally attacked Hermenegild’s allies in Seville. It took him until 584 to finally subdue Hermenegild and restore order to the kingdom, after which Liuvigild turned his attention to the Suevi, who had possibly supported Hermenegild’s revolt, and subdued the western part of the peninsula.
Conquest could be difficult, but revolt was devastating, because there did not seem to be ample resources to defend the kingdom from both simultaneous internal and external threats. Thus, when Liuvigild returned to conquest after the defeat of Hermenegild’s rebellion, his campaigns left other portions of his kingdom vulnerable, which invited a major Frankish invasion in the year 585. This is a particularly interesting event because it is one of the rare occasions in which there are multiple sources giving alternate accounts. John of Biclar provides a bare account, but Gregory of Tours (538-594) gives a much fuller one and from the point of view of the Franks. According to Gregory, King Guntram assembled a large army from across his kingdom and swept west from the Rhône until they reached Carcassone, which seems to have been their initial target, as part of Guntram’s larger ambition to drive the Visigoths completely out of Gaul.
The army itself was made up of men from a large number of cities and regions, spread out across Guntram’s kingdom, and assembling them all represented a massive undertaking that could not have been easy to conceal. Thus, it is a bit surprising when there were no Visigothic forces to meet them or challenge the invasion. The initial Frankish strategy worked, as they easily marched across Visigothic territory and gained entrance into Carcassone, which was awaiting their arrival with open gates. This suggests some prearrangement on the part of the Franks to find friendly elements inside the city to turn it over to the Franks. The plan went awry, however, because a conflict broke out between the people of Carcassone and the Frankish army, which led to the expulsion of the Franks from the city and a general Frankish retreat. John of Biclar and Gregory of Tours give slightly different accounts of the events that occurred next. According to John of Biclar, Reccared went north with an army and drove the Franks back into their own territory. According to Gregory, the Visigoths responded to the Frankish threat by engaging in small-scale ambushes during the Frankish retreat back to their own territory. The two accounts both give the same basic story that the Frankish invasion was a failure, and that Reccared successfully engaged the Franks in Frankish territory, capturing two fortresses. Gregory’s story of a two-part Visigothic response is appealing because it gives specific details, specific names, and shows the Visigoths in a positive light – something he is typically loathe to do.
An important question, though, is where was the army in the beginning? In a region like Narbonensis, bordering the lands of ambitious Frankish monarchs, why was there not a permanent military presence? The Visigoths offered no resistance to the Franks and the ambushes that Gregory mentions do not appear to have been part of an organized military response. Because John of Biclar does not bother to mention these attacks, it is likely that they did not involve any notable citizens, but probably local inhabitants with some of the Visigothic garrison troops engaging the disorganized Frankish army in its retreat. If so, this further suggests some sort of widespread pro-Visigothic or anti-Frankish sentiment throughout Narbonensis, as guerilla-style ambushes would be difficult to perform successfully without a basic level of support from the populace. Although some people from Carcassone seem to have initially sided with the Franks, the population of the region as a whole ultimately seems to have rejected the Franks and joined in driving them from the province – even without the help of a professional army.
It is interesting to note that during this same year the Visigoths were also forced to respond to a revolt in Galicia, which was suppressed by Liuvigild’s generals. This is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it required the Visigothic army to engage in separate campaigns in a single year, which were far apart geographically, and it shows that they were able to do so successfully. Second, these two episodes were the only times during the era of Liuvigild when the Visigothic army was engaged without Liuvigild leading it himself. Since he died in the very next year, it is reasonable to believe that he was unable to lead the army, but the episodes also suggest that Liuvigild had begun the process of creating a tradition for a standing army that could work under the leadership of ducesand did not necessarily need the king at its head for engagement. This is an important development that Reccared further exploited.
With the death of Liuvigild in 586, Reccared became king and inherited what was in many ways a stable and unified kingdom. The Franks had been pushed back into their own territory, the Romans on the coast were contained, the Suevic kingdom had been conquered, and inroads had been made into Basque territory. Still, there was the potential for dangerous conflict laying just beneath the surface because of the strong religious divisions that had become pronounced during Hermenegild’s revolt and Liuvigild’s attempt to suppress Catholicism. Like his father, Reccared believed that the kingdom should be unified around an official religion that would include Visigoth and Roman alike but, unlike his father, Reccared decided to focus his efforts on expanding the Catholic faith and eliminating Arianism.
Naturally, the Catholic conversion resulted in a great number of changes to the kingdom, but the most important result, for the purposes of this paper, is that it led to a series of revolts among the Gothic nobility, which required Reccared to ally with the Hispano-Romans over his own people. In a sense, this was the beginning of true unity among the people of the Visigothic kingdom, who would become united both politically and religiously for the first time.
Reccared’s attempts to establish a broad base of support among the native Hispano-Romans becomes most apparent in his reaction to a revolt and an invasion that occurred in Narbonensis in 589. There are four different accounts of this episode, including accounts by Gregory of Tours, John of Biclar, Isidore of Seville, and the anonymous, seventh-century Vitas Sanctorum Patrum Emeretensium (VPE), and each differs slightly from the others in detail. The VPE is the most striking in its differences, because it is the only source that draws a connection between the revolt of the Visigothic nobility and the Frankish invasion. Because of this it is also instrumental in helping to establish an understanding of the invasion, and the importance of Reccared’s response. Combining the four accounts creates a picture of Frankish intrigue, Visigothic dissatisfaction and ultimately, the triumph of Reccared’s vision for the transformation of the kingdom into a Catholic, Hispano-Roman/Visigothic state.
Guntram’s previous invasion of Narbonensis seemed to rely on the compliance of the people of Carcassone, which suggests that he had established contacts with disaffected citizens there who were willing to overthrow Visigothic control and accept Frankish rule. Thus, it is not surprising to find in the VPE account that this new invasion was the result of a few Gothic nobles who had made their own contacts with the Franks and invited in a new invading army. This fits well with Gregory’s account in which Guntram sent Duke Astrovald to Carcassone ahead of the main army “to receive oaths of allegiance and subject the people to the authority of the king.” Gregory writes that the commander of the main army, Duke Bosso, ridiculed Astrovald for entering Carcassone ahead of the main army, so it appears that Astrovald accomplished his mission and did not meet any resistance. Once again Carcassone was in the center of a plot to betray Narbonensis to the Franks.
Reccared’s reaction to these developments, however, was markedly different from what his father, or any previous Visigothic king had done. He did not lead an army against the Franks himself, as he had done only a few years earlier, but instead sent a general, Claudius, leading a small army. This in itself is significant because, except for the final two years of Liuvigild’s life, up to this point, even extending back into the fourth century when the Visigoths made their initial crossing into Roman territory, it was the king himself who typically led the army. Reccared certainly had military experience and had successfully faced the Franks in that very region, so not only would it have been possible for him to have led the army in this war, but it also would have been expected to some extent, especially since some of the nobility in the region were in revolt and this would have provided him an excellent opportunity to establish personal authority by making his presence felt on the battlefield. The sources give no reasons for his absence from command.
There had been recent attempts by some of the nobility to seize control of the kingdom from Reccared, so it makes a great deal of sense that he would have remained near the capital to maintain the reins of power. Still, it is interesting to recall that Liuvigild had not accompanied his armies on their final campaigns, either in Narbonensis or in Galicia and that, in both 587 and in this war in 589, Reccared relied on generals to lead his armies against the Franks. This means that for the previous four conflicts (three against the Franks and one in Galicia) the Visigothic king had appointed generals to lead the armies. Although it is possible that Liuvigild was physically incapable of engaging in the rigors of military activity near the end of his life, Reccared certainly was capable, especially in 587, before the revolts of the nobility had begun. One possible interpretation of this is that Liuvigild, and then Reccared, were in the process of revising the Visigothic military system, and creating a more permanent, standing army that would be led by generals instead of the king.
If so, the revolt of the Visigothic nobility should have created a serious problem for this effort, but instead it created a unique opportunity for Reccared to include Hispano-Romans in the higher power-structure and completely alter the power-dynamic of the kingdom. Reccared did not lead the army against the Franks himself, nor did he turn to a trusted Gothic noble, but instead chose Claudius, a prominent Hispano-Roman duke from Lusitania to defend the kingdom from the Franks. From one point of view, it is an odd choice because the sources list few, if any, prominent Hispano-Romans leading armies on behalf of their king. Beyond that, according to John of Biclar, Claudius was the duxof Lusitania, which means that his personal army and his base of power was a great distance from Narbonensis.
On the other hand, it was an inspired choice because it necessarily created cross-regional contacts between the political leadership of the southwestern portions of the kingdom with the population of the most northeastern portions of the kingdom which could not have helped but to create a sense of unity around the Visigothic kingdom. The people of Narbonensis would know that they were being defended by Lusitanians. Although the sources differ on whether this event occurred before or after the Third Council of Toledo (589), it occurred around the same time and should be connected to the general sentiment present at that council, namely that the people of the Visigothic kingdom should be united and feel a part of one kingdom, sharing both political life as well as religious faith.
Almost as though it had been a scripted event, Claudius’s victory was hailed by the Visigothic sources as miraculous, and by Gregory of Tours as an astounding defeat for the Franks. As was previously stated, the sources vary in specific detail, but the three which discuss the war itself (the VPE does not discuss the actual war, but instead attributes victory to the hand of God) agree that a small Visigothic army defeated a large Frankish army and killed thousands of Frankish soldiers. The battle seems to have permanently altered Visigothic/Frankish relations as Guntram ended all efforts to take Narbonensis by force. Sources do not mention any other wars against the Franks during the remainder of Reccared’s life. In fact, when Isidore discusses further military actions he specifically mentions conflicts with the Romans on the coast and with the Basques, but nothing against the Franks:
“He [Reccared] often moved his forces against both Roman arrogance and the attacks of the Basques, when he seemed not so much to have managed wars as to have exercised the people for their benefit as in the sport of wrestling.”
Although it would be inadvisable to make too much of this passage, it is still interesting because it marks another possible shift from the traditional Visigothic approach to warfare that was prominent in the writings of earlier authors, such as Jordanes (mid-sixth century). Visigothic kings led their armies personally and they fought for a variety of reasons, especially plunder and conquest, but typically not as a form of exercise. Isidore does not go into detail here, and the passage has a rhetorical flair that suggests his intent is to glorify Reccared rather than give an accurate account of military affairs, but it is still worth considering that the overall force of Isidore’s statement is that Reccared saw value in military service beyond defense, conquest and plunder. Taken along with the burgeoning development of the military at the end of Liuvigild’s life and the beginning of Reccared’s reign, it seems as though Reccared was using the military as a tool for fostering national unification by giving his people a sense of unity and purpose – and by drawing firm distinctions between the people of his kingdom and the “others” among the Basques and the Romans.
Over the course of the sixth century the Visigothic Kingdom changed dramatically, going through periods of weakness and uncertainty before finally ending the century controlling nearly the entire Iberian Peninsula and most of the people therein. Although the process by which these disparate communities joined into a unified kingdom was complex, the military played an indispensable role. This paper is not intended to offer an in-depth study of the Visigothic military or a complete discussion of the topic, but hopefully does offer a useful suggestion about the important role the military played during the sixth century in uniting the various peoples of the peninsula under a single, strong monarchy.
 John of Biclar, Chron. 91. For an edition see Iohannis abbatis Biclarensis chronica, ed. Theodor Mommsen, MGH AA xi, Chron. Min. 2 (Berlin: Weidman, 1894), 207-21. For a translation see Kenneth Baxter Wolf, Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain, 2nd edn. (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999).
 See Dionisio Pérez Sánchez, El ejército en la sociedad visigoda (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1989), esp. Ch. 5, for a discussion of the development and nature of private armies in the Visigothic kingdom during the sixth century.
 Edward James, “Septimania and its Frontier: An Archaeological Approach,” in Visigothic Spain: New Approaches, ed. Edward James (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 223; Leif Inge Ree Peterson, Siege Warfare and Military Organization in the Successor States: Byzantium, the West and Islam (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 164.
 Procopius, History 5.5.2. For edition and translation see Procopius, History of the Wars, ed. T. E. Page and W. H. D. Rouse, trans. H. B. Dewing, Loeb Classics (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1914).
 Ibid., 5.11.1.
 Ibid., 5.11.16-17.
 Ibid., 5.13.16: “[…] ΓαλλίαντεκαὶἸταλίαν […] καταθέσουσιν, ἤν αὐτὸς τῷ παντὶ στρατῷ ἐς Ῥώμην ἐλάςῃ.” Translations are my own unless otherwise noted.
 Ibid., 5.11.28. Procopius mentions that he distributes “arms and horses” (“ὅπλα τε καὶ ἵππους”). Apparently, they did not maintain these on their own, or perhaps he has to rely on conscription to supplement the core of the armed forces, which was certainly the highest-ranking members of the nobility. Whatever the truth may be, it is certain that even during the long-standing conflict with the Franks, the Ostrogoths did not maintain a regular standing army that would have been large enough both to defend the borders and towns as well as engage in offensive operations against the Franks.
 John of Biclar, Chron. 51: “Liuuigildus rex extinctis undique tyrannis, et pervasoribus Hispaniae superatis sortitus requiem propriam cum plebe resedit.”
 Ibid., 55: “civitates atque castella.”
 Ibid., 58.
 Ibid., 61.
 Ibid., 65: “Liuuigildus rex exercitum ad expugnandum tyrannum filium colligit.”
 Ibid., 65: “exercitum […] colligit.”
 Ibid., 66.
 Ibid., 69, 73.
 Ibid., 75; Gregory of Tours, History of the Franks 8.30. For the latter, see Decem libri historiarum. Gregorii episcopi Turonensis. Libri Historiarum X, ed. Bruno Krusch and Wilhelm Levison, MGH SRM I 1 (Hannover, 1951).
 John of Biclar, Chron. 77.
 John of Biclar, Chron. 58; Isidore of Seville, History, 50; Gregory of Tours, History of the Franks, V.38.
 Isidore of Seville, History of the Goths, 52-53.
 Gregory of Tours, History of the Franks, 9.31-32; John of Biclar, Chron. 91; Isidore of Seville, History of the Goths, 54; Vitas Sanctorum Patrum Emeretensium, V.XII. For an edition and translation of Isidore see, respectively, Las Historias de los godos, los vándalos y los suevosde Isidoro de Sevilla, ed. Cristóbal Rodríguez Alonso (León, 1975) and Kenneth Baxter Wolf, Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain, 2nd edn. (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 79-110. For an edition and translation of the VPE see respectively Vitas Sanctorum Patrum Emeretensium, ed. Antonio Maya Sánchez (Turnhout: Brepols, 1992) and Andy Fear, Lives of the Fathers of Mérida, Lives of the Visigothic Fathers (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1997), 45-106.
 Gregory of Tours, History of the Franks 9.31: “sacramenta susciperat ipsosque populos ditioni subegerat regiae.”
 John of Biclar, Chron. 86, 91.
 VPE 5.12: “The High and All-powerful God […] by the prayers of the most excellent princeps Reccared […] worked a marvelous retribution (“sublimis atque omnipotens Deus […] precibus excellentissimi Reccaredi principis […] mirificam fecit ultionem”).
 Isidore of Seville, De Origine Gothorum 54: “saepe etiam et lacertos contra Romanae insolentias et inruptiones Vasconum movit, ubi non magis bella tractasse quam potius gentem quasi in palaestrae ludo pro usu utilitatis videtur exercuisse.”
 The authors who discuss the wars of the Visigoths between the fourth and sixth centuries typically, though not always, show the Visigothic armies being led directly by their monarch. Jordanes gives the most complete history of the Visigoths and Ostrogoths from their earlier history until the early sixth century. For an edition and translation of Jordanes see, respectively, Iordanis: Romana et Getica, ed. Theodor Mommsen, MGH AA V (Berlin, 1882) and Charles Christopher Mierow, The Gothic History of Jordanes: in English Version with an Introduction and a Commentary (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1915).
 Guy Halsall, Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450-900 (New York: Routledge, 2003), 135-36. I suspect that Isidore’s statement here was in part an attempt to place Reccared within the Roman civic tradition. Roman authors often saw warfare as a means of fostering discipline and moral character in society. See Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, I.19 for a specific instance of this sentiment. For edition and translation see Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, ed. and trans. B. O. Foster, Loeb Classics (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1919).
Gregory of Tours. Decem libri historiarum. Gregorii episcopi Turonensis. Libri Historiarum X. Edited by Bruno Krusch and Wilhelm Levison. MGH SRM I 1. Hannover, 1951.
Isidore of Seville. De Origine Gothorum. Las Historias de los godos, los vándalos y los suevosde Isidoro de Sevilla, edited by Cristóbal Rodríguez Alonso. León, 1975. Translated in Kenneth Baxter Wolf, Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain, 2nd edn., 79-110. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999.
John of Biclar. Chronicles. In Iohannis abbatis Biclarensis chronica, edited by Theodor Mommsen, Chron. Min. 2, MGH AA xi, 207-21. Berlin: Weidman, 1894. Translated in Kenneth Baxter Wolf, Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain, 2nd edn., 57-78. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999.
Jordanes. Getica. In Iordanis: Romana et Getica, edited by Theodor Mommsen, MGH AA v, 53-138. Berlin: Weidmann, 1882. Translated in Charles Christopher Mierow, The Gothic History of Jordanes: in English Version with an Introduction and a Commentary. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1915.
Leges Visigothorum (Liber Iudiciorum). Edited by Karl Zeumer, MGH, Legum, I, Hannover et Leipzig, 1902; Visigothic Code. Translated by Samuel Parsons Scott. Boston: Boston Book Co, 1910.
Livy. Ab Urbe Condita, edited and translated by B. O. Foster. Loeb Classics. New York: The MacMillan Co., 1919.
Procopius. History of the Wars. Edited by T. E. Page and W. H. D. Rouse, and translated by H. B. Dewing. Loeb Classics. New York: The MacMillan Co., 1914.
Vitas Sanctorum Patrum Emeretensium. Edited by Antonio Maya Sánchez. Turnhout: Brepols, 1992. Translated in Andrew Fear, Lives of the Fathers of Mérida, Lives of the Visigothic Fathers, 45-106. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1997.
Burns, Thomas S. Barbarians within the Gates of Rome: A Study of Roman Military Policy and the Barbarians, CA. 375-425 A.D. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.
Campos, Julio. Juan de Bíclaro, obispo de Gerona: su vida y su obra. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1960.
Castellanos, Santiago. Los Godos y la cruz: Recaredo y la unidad de Spania.Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2007.
Collins, Roger. Visigothic Spain, 409-711. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.
Halsall, Guy. Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450-900. New York: Routledge, 2003.
James, Edward. “Septimania and its Frontier: An Archaeological Approach.” In Visigothic Spain: New Approaches, edited by Edward James, 223-41. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.
Pérez Sánchez, Dionisio. El ejército en la sociedad visigoda. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1989.
Riess, Frank. Narbonne and its Territory in Late Antiquity: From the Visigoths to the Arabs. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013.
Peterson, Leif Inge Ree. Siege Warfare and Military Organization in the Successor States: Byzantium, the West and Islam. Leiden: Brill, 2013.
Stocking, Rachel. Bishops, Councils, and Consensus in the Visigothic Kingdom, 589-633. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000.
Valverde Castro, María R. Ideología, simbolismo, y ejercicio del poder real en la monarquía visigoda: un proceso de cambio. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 2000.